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Using data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence 
of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger 
and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these 
results, which contrast with previous contributions, we develop a model of growth with 
quality improvements where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited 
by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry 
of high-quality competitors. This requires that the incumbent politician remains in office and 
that the red-tape cost advantage granted by political connections is large relative to the quality 
upgrade related to innovation. Consistently with our empirical findings, the model delivers a 
negative association between the probability that the incumbent politician remains in office 
and average economic growth in the presence of high bureaucratic costs. 
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ours alone. 1 Introduction
Low turnover of politicians is a feature of political systems in several countries. For
example, in 2002, 398 US House members ran for re-election, and only 16 were defeated,
while a mere 3 out of 26 senators running for re-election lost. A recent cross-country
analysis of comparative turnover rates, based on lower house legislative elections from
1979 through 1994 for twenty-￿ve countries, shows that the mean of incumbents returning
rate is 67.7% (see Matland and Studlar [21]). For the US, Merlo et al. [22] report that
re-election rate in the Congress between 1951 and 1994 was never below 80%. In Italy,
re-election rate in Parliament between 1951 and 2008, though more volatile than in the
US, never fell below 60% and was around 80% in several elections.1
In some countries, among which Italy is certainly a prominent example, the existence
of long-lived political and economic elites is often blamed for the low rate of technological
innovation, economic growth and social mobility. Politicians and major economic actors
are perceived as an inaccessible and self-su¢ cient core that rules the country by means
of long-lasting personal relations, contacts and acquaintances, preventing access to power
by more dynamic (and young) individuals and creating a relationship-based system where
economic outcomes tend to be driven by ￿knowing the right person in the right place￿
more than by the market.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between political persistence and growth
by ￿rst performing an empirical analysis in a sample of 56 developing and developed
countries, which are democratic according to the de￿nition of the World Bank￿ s Database
of Political Institutions (Beck et al. [4]), for the period 1975-2004. Measuring political
persistence with the percentage of main political entities (￿veto players￿ ) who remain in
place in the government in any given year (available from the same data set), we detect
a negative association between political persistence and economic growth. Elaborating
further on this ￿rst result, we ￿nd that the inverse relation between persistence and growth
is driven by countries where red-tape costs are relatively high.
It is worth emphasizing that our empirical ￿ndings, which associate low persistence
with high growth, are at odds with the conclusions of the existing literature on political
instability and economic growth. In fact, almost all contributions use data on revolutions,
coups and assassinations to construct a measure of political instability (see, for instance
Alesina et al. [2] and the survey of the literature in Carmignani [10]). Not surprisingly,
1The lowest re-election rate (60.5%) occured in the 1994 election, after the ￿Mani Pulite￿scandal which
decimated previously ruling parties.
1these studies ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of stability on growth. On the contrary, our ￿ndings
suggest that, when government change occurs through democratic institutions, political
turnover (i.e. instability) rather than political persistence (i.e. stability) is positively asso-
ciated with growth in countries where red-tape costs are high, while no robust correlation
emerges when red-tape costs are low.2
Our suggested interpretation of these results is that high political persistence may lead
to low innovation and growth via the relationship between political connections and ￿rms￿
competitiveness that may become crucial in highly regulated economies. We believe that,
in the presence of high levels of regulation, personal relations and experience tend to be-
come an important instrument for incumbent ￿rms to maintain their leadership. Strong
and long-established network with politicians helps connected ￿rms to avoid, or at least
alleviate, red-tape costs due to cumbersome bureaucratic and administrative requirements
and/or ine¢ cient bureaucracy, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over more inno-
vative ￿rms lacking connections, that may ￿nd it very di¢ cult even to enter the market.
Thus, political persistence may be detrimental to growth in countries with high levels of
regulation (e.g. Italy), while it would be unin￿ uential (abstracting from other possible
mechanisms that may imply a relationship between persistence and growth) in countries
where regulation is low (e.g. the US).3
Motivated by our empirical evidence, in the second part of the paper we develop a
theoretical analysis whose main novelty is to set up a model to illustrate a mechanism
through which political persistence can indeed hinder economic growth. We introduce
political networks in a model of growth with quality improvements ￿ la Aghion and Howitt
[1]. In the intermediate good sector, red-tape costs can be mitigated through political
connections. Networks with politicians are established by producers and pay o⁄ with one
period lag, so that only re-elected politicians can provide favors to ￿rms. The incumbent
2An exception is the paper by Feng [15], who distinguishes between irregular and regular government
changes and ￿nds that stability enhances growth in the case of irregular changes, but is negatively associated
with growth in the case of regular changes. Our empirical analysis, using a completely di⁄erent dataset and
exploiting the time dimension, shows that the negative relation between political persistence (stability)
and growth is robust solely in countries that we classify as high red-tape costs.
3According to Doing Business 2008, Italy ranks 53 (out of 155 countries) in the ease of doing business,
well below many emerging and less developed economies, while the US ranks 3. Dealing with licenses (in
the construction industry) takes on average 257 days in Italy and 40 days in the US, with a cost of 138% of
income per capita in Italy and 13.4% in the US. Starting a business requires a cost of 18.7% of income per
capita in Italy compared to only 0.7% in the US. According to the executive opinion survey of the Global
Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, the main problematic factor for doing business in Italy is ine¢ cient
government bureaucracy.
2￿rm and the outside ￿rm (which is endowed with the leading-edge technology) engage
in Bertrand competition. Under certain conditions , the next-to-top-quality (incumbent)
producer has the opportunity to keep her monopoly position and prevent innovation by
exploiting her network advantage and the resulting cost reductions.
The main implications are two-fold. In the short-run, keeping the political status-quo
leads to income maximization as it allows to exploit lower production costs and lower
prices. In the long-run, however, the perpetuation of the network between incumbent
politicians and ￿rms blocks innovation and is detrimental to economic growth, leading
to technological backwardness. Consistently with our empirical ￿ndings, this negative
e⁄ect of political persistence emerges only when bureaucratic and administrative costs are
large enough and/or the bureaucracy is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient to make red-tape costs large
relative to the quality upgrade related to innovation. When these costs are low, innovation
cannot be blocked and political networks become irrelevant.
Besides the already mentioned literature on political instability and growth, our work
is related to recent (mainly) empirical contributions that investigate the relevance of po-
litical connections on ￿rms￿performance. From a cross-country perspective, Faccio [13]
documents the widespread existence of political connections and that these connections
signi￿cantly add to company values. Faccio et al. [14] ￿nd that politically-connected ￿rms
are signi￿cantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected ￿rms. More im-
portantly for our paper, Desai and Olofsgard [12] investigate the consequences of political
connections on in￿ uential ￿rms and ￿nd that they encounter fewer administrative and
regulatory burdens and invest and innovate less.
Moreover, although the political network in our analysis does not involve any form
of administrative or bureaucratic bribing, our work is related to the literature on the
economics of corruption.4 Recently, Harstad and Svensson [17] developed a theoretical
model where ￿rms, instead of complying with regulation, can either bribe or lobby the
government and study under which conditions ￿rms decide to bribe or lobby and the e⁄ects
of this choice on economic growth. Blackburn and Sarmah [6] study a model where private
agents can bribe bureaucrats in return for being freed from red-tape and bureaucrats
choose optimally the amount of red-tape, as an instrument of rent extraction. None of
these papers, however, analyze the relationship between red-tape, political persistence,
innovation and economic growth, which is instead the focus of our research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between political persistence and growth taking into account cross-country di⁄erences
4For a review of the literature on corruption, see Bardhan [3] and Svensson [24].
3in red-tape costs. Section 3 develops the theoretical model and characterizes the static
equilibrium, while Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating evidence
The aim of this Section is to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between
political persistence and growth. Our investigation is based on a sample of 56 countries
over the 1975-2004 period. Following the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), we
measure political persistence (PERS) as the percentage of main political entities (such
as the prime minister, the larger parties in the government coalition, etc.) who remain
in place in the government in any given year, relative to the previous one.5 To capture
political turnover that takes place through democratic institutions, we restrict our analysis
to democracies. Using DPI de￿nitions, we consider a country as democratic in year t if
for that country legislative and executive competitiveness (LIEC and EIEC, respectively)
both take their maximum value in year t.
As it is well known, the identi￿cation of exogenous source of variation of right-hand
side variables in cross-country growth regressions is a di¢ cult task, so that we will rely on
panel data estimation in order to deal (at least partially) with sources of endogeneity bias
that may be present in OLS estimation using cross-country data. In particular, the bias
introduced by the omission of country-speci￿c permanent e⁄ects that may be correlated
with right-hand side variables is well known to be pervasive in cross-country OLS estimates
of growth regressions (see, for example, the discussion in Temple [23]).
Thus, we begin our analysis estimating a growth regression by means of Least Square
Dummy Variable (LSDV), including time and country ￿xed e⁄ects to eliminate any within
country and within period common trends. To this end, we construct six 5-year periods
between 1975 and 2004. To perform ￿xed e⁄ects estimation we need at least two obser-
vations for each country. Since we will regress growth on lagged persistence, observations
are included only if a country is democratic for at least three consecutive periods between
1975 and 2004, giving rise to an unbalanced panel of 205 observations for 56 countries.
The dependent variable, GROWTH, is the average annual per capita GDP growth
rate at constant 2005 PPP USD, over the 5-year periods between 1980 and 2004 and
PERS is the (lagged) average persistence over the 5-year periods. In some speci￿cations
5A more detailed explanation about the de￿nition of PERS can be found in the Data Appendix. It is
worth emphasizing that, di⁄erently from widely used de￿nitions of political stability, our measure captures
political changes not only in electoral years but also during the legislature.
4we include standard controls, such as the log level of initial GDP per capita (GDP), the
investment share of GDP (INV), the average schooling years in total population (EDU),
the government expenditure share of GDP (GOV), and fertility rate (FERT). In order to
alleviate estimation bias due to measurement error and reverse causation, all controls are
taken at the beginning of each period, with the exception of EDU which is the average
over the current and previous 5-year periods and PERS which is the 5-year average over
the previous period.
More speci￿cally, we estimate the following equation:
GROWTHit = ￿ + ￿1PERSit￿1 + ￿Xit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (1)
where i denotes country, t the time period, Xit is a vector of controls, ￿i are country ￿xed
e⁄ects, ￿t are time ￿xed e⁄ects and "it is the error term.
Column (1) in Table 1 reports estimation results for a baseline regression including
only time and country ￿xed e⁄ects and PERS as explanatory variables. The coe¢ cient
for PERS is negative and signi￿cant (at 10% level). In column (2) we add all other
controls and the previous result is con￿rmed with an increase in the signi￿cance of PERS.
Notice that this negative association between political persistence and economic growth
contrasts with the results of the existing literature on political instability and growth,
as surveyed in Carmignani [10]. In fact, by using measures of political instability based
on data on revolutions, coups and assassinations, these studies ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of
stability on growth. On the contrary, our ￿ndings suggest that, when government change
occurs through democratic institutions, political turnover (i.e. instability) is positively
associated with growth.6
What could explain our results? Our interpretation is that high political persistence
may hinder growth through the relationship between political connections and ￿rms￿com-
petitiveness. More speci￿cally, in the presence of high levels of regulation, strong and
long-established networks with politicians may help connected ￿rms to reduce the burden
of administrative and bureaucratic costs. These connected ￿rms would then enjoy a com-
petitive advantage over more innovative ￿rms that lack connections and may ￿nd it very
di¢ cult even to enter the market. As mentioned in the Introduction, Desai and Olofsgard
[12] investigate the consequences of political connections on about 10.0000 ￿rms surveyed
6In a recent paper, Besley, Persson and Sturm [5] investigate the relationship between political com-
petition and economic growth. Using data on US states, they ￿nd evidence that political competition
is positively associated with growth. Insofar as the lack of political competition could be related to our
notion of political persistence, their empirical ￿ndings somehow con￿rm our results obtained in a panel of
countries.
5in 40 developing countries and ￿nd that in￿ uential ￿rms face fewer administrative and
regulatory burdens and invest and innovate less.
As this interpretation emphasizes the role of red-tape costs due to cumbersome regula-
tion and bureaucratic ine¢ ciency, we explore the possibility that the relationship between
persistence and growth might be weak (and possibly negligible) in low-cost countries while
negative in high-cost countries. Thus, we use the index of Bureaucratic Quality (BQ) con-
structed in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to classify countries as low or
high red-tape cost. In particular, we de￿ne a country as low (high) cost if BQ is above
(below) a given threshold and specify the following equation:
GROWTHit = ￿ + ￿1PERSit￿1 + ￿2(dH
i ￿ PERSit￿1) + ￿Xit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (2)
where dH
i is a dummy for high red-tape costs, and dH
i ￿PERSit￿1 is the interaction of this
dummy with our measure of persistence. The dummy variable dH takes value one (zero)
when BQ is below (above) 3:5 (in 1984).7;8 Following our previous argument, we will test
the hypothesis that ￿1 = 0 and (￿1 + ￿2) < 0.
Column (3) in Table 1 replicates the baseline regression of column (1), limiting the
sample to countries for which data on BQ are available. The coe¢ cient for PERS is
again negative, slightly larger in absolute value and signi￿cant at 5% level. In columns (4)
and (5) we split the sample into low and high-cost countries, respectively. Consistently
with our interpretation, the negative correlation is present only in high-cost countries,
while it disappears in low-cost countries. In column (6), we include the interaction term
(dH￿PERS): our null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level. In column (7) our set
of controls is added. Results are basically unchanged; in particular b ￿1 = 0 and the sum
b ￿1 + b ￿2 is negative and strongly signi￿cant.
In column (8) we introduce a proxy of corruption, CORR from ICRG, which measures
actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation,
7The BQ index takes values between 0 and 4, with 0 denoting lowest quality. This variable captures one
determinant of red-tape costs, that is a bureaucracy which is weak and ine¢ cient (see the Data Appendix
for the exact de￿nition). We prefer this to alternative proxies of red-tape costs - such as, for example,
measures of government e⁄ectiveness from the World Bank￿ s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufman
et al.[19]) and indicators of the cost of setting up and operating a business (Doing Business: Measuring
Business Regulations [25])- since it is available for a longer time span, allowing us to measure red-tape
costs at the beginning of the period.
8Data appendix provides the list of high (low) cost countries according to our threshold. Notice that
approximamtely 54% of the observations in our sample belong to high-cost countries. Moreover, we also
performed our empirical anlaysis with threshold values ranging between 3.1 and 3.9 (notice that OECD
average is 3.56). Results are qualitatively unchanged, as very few countries are a⁄ected by these changes.
6￿favors-for favors￿ , secret party funding, etc.9 Comparing results with those of column (7),
notice that there are no changes whatsoever and that corruption is not signi￿cant. These
￿ndings suggest that formal corruption is not the main channel through which political
persistence is related to growth and are in line with our argument which relies on personal
acquaintances and connections, which are not necessarily a form of explicit and illegal
corruption.
As it is well known (see, for instance, Caselli et al. [11]), estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ects
version of equations (1) and (2) raises some concerns, as the model underlying the standard
growth equation is intrinsically dynamic, automatically introducing a bias in our LSDV
estimates in Table 1. Although the bias approaches zero as T ! 1, LSDV estimates are
inconsistent when T is small, as it is the case in our sample.
The procedure proposed for small samples by Kiviet [20] and developed, for the case
of unbalanced panels, by Bruno [8], produces e¢ cient estimates. To apply this procedure,
we estimated the coe¢ cients of the following equation:
GDPit = ￿0 + ￿1GDPit￿1 + ￿2PERSit￿1 + ￿3(dH
i ￿ PERSit￿1) + ￿i + ￿t + "it (3)
by means of Anderson-Hsiao technique10 and use them to correct the (inconsistent) coef-
￿cients obtained by LSDV estimation of the same equation.11
Table 2 reports LSDV (columns 1 and 3) and our corrected LSDV estimates (columns
2 and 4), henceforth LSDVC, obtained without and with the inclusion of the interaction
term dH￿PERS in equation (3). To save degrees of freedom, we include only time and
country ￿xed e⁄ects as additional regressors, since the ￿rst step of the LSDVC procedure
determines a substantial loss of observations. Notice that, as the original growth equation
(2) was written in terms of average annual growth rates, the coe¢ cients in Table 2 must
be divided by ￿ve for comparison with Table 1.
Inspection of columns (2) and (4) shows that the LSDVC procedure corrects for the
downward bias in the LSDV estimates of the GDP coe¢ cient. With regard to political
persistence, notice that b ￿2 in column (2) is signi￿cant at 10% level, while the sum b ￿2+b ￿3 in
9CORR takes values between 0 and 6, with low values indicating poor control of corruption. Like other
controls, observations for CORR are taken at the beginning of each 5-year period.
10This requires to ￿rst di⁄erence equation (3), to remove ￿xed e⁄ects, and instrument for GDPit￿1 ￿
GDPit￿2 with GDPit￿2. A complete description of the corrected LSDV procedure and of its Stata routine
is provided by Bruno [9].
11As discussed by Judson and Owen [18], the use of Arellano-Bond and Anderson-Hsiao estimation
techniques, generally employed in dynamic panel data, is not recommendable in our case, due to the large
variance of these estimators in small samples.
7column (4) is not signi￿cant although almost identical to the corresponding coe¢ cients of
column (1) and (3). A possible explanation for this loss of signi￿cance is that many high-
cost countries have short time dimension (only 2 or 3 observations are available). Thus, the
application of our procedure implies a loss of information which is concentrated among
those countries (i.e. high-cost ones) that we expect to be responsible for the negative
correlation between persistence and growth.
Overall, our ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates highlight a negative correlation between political
persistence and growth in democratic countries with high red-tape costs. Our results do
not necessarily identify a causal e⁄ect of persistence on growth because of the possible
reverse e⁄ect of growth on persistence and because there may be other time-varying con-
founding factors such that Cov(PERSit￿1;"it) 6= 0: To tackle these issues, we tried to
perform an instrumental-variable estimation using dummies for proportional vs. majori-
tarian, closed vs. open list electoral systems, and the number of elections. Unfortunately,
these variables turned out not to be valid instruments.
However it is worth noting that, according to the conventional wisdom, growth should
have a positive e⁄ect on political persistence so that Cov(PERSit￿1;"it) ￿ 0. Thus, when
inconsistent, our ￿xed-e⁄ect estimator will be biased upward, so that our estimation results
could be viewed as upper bounds (in absolute terms) on the causal e⁄ect of persistence
on growth. In other words, if we could control for reverse causation, the negative e⁄ect
of persistence on growth should actually turn out to be even stronger than what we have
found.12
Motivated by our empirical ￿ndings, in the next Section, we will present a theoretical
model where exogenous political persistence a⁄ects growth and where red-tape costs play
a crucial role in the presence of established relationships and networks between main
economic actors and politicians.
3 The model
Consider an economy populated by a continuous mass of in￿nitely-lived agents. In each
period, agents have one unit of time that can be supplied inelastically to production in
12From an empirical point of view, the idea that high economic growth should help incumbent politicians
to be re-elected has been recently tested in a large cross-section of countries by Brender and Drazen
[7]. They ￿nd that growth raises the probability of re-election only in less developed countries and new
democracies and only insofar as it is not attributed to global growth.
8the ￿nal good sector or in managing a ￿rm in the intermediate good sector.13 The utility
function is linear in consumption in each period. Future consumption is discounted at the
subjective discount factor ￿ = 1=(1+r) where r is the interest rate, which implies that in
each period consumption is equal to income.
In each period t output in the ￿nal good sector is given by:
yt = e x￿
t Lt
1￿￿ (4)
where Lt is labor, e xt =
PQ(t)
q=0 ￿qxq is a quality-adjusted intermediate input, with q denoting
quality rung of intermediate good xq that has quality ￿q: K(t) denotes the highest quality
level in use at time t. We will take the ￿nal good as numeraire and normalize its price
to one. We assume no population growth and normalize L = 1. The ￿nal good sector is
perfectly competitive. The intermediate good is produced using the ￿nal good by means
of a linear technology.
To keep the economic side of the model simple and focus on the relationship between
innovation, growth and political persistence, we abstract from endogenous innovation de-
termined by R&D and from the potential catching up associated to distance to frontier.
Speci￿cally, we assume that in each period exogenous technological progress makes a
higher quality version of the intermediate good available. Technological upgrade is limited
to the next higher quality good (step-by-step innovation). For reasons that will become
clear later, technology adoption occurs with a given probability that is related to political
outcomes. Thus, if technology j is the highest quality adopted at t ￿ 1, only technology
j + 1 can be adopted at time t, although other superior technologies may be available.
Nature randomly chooses who has the monopoly right to produce the highest vintage
of the intermediate good in each period. This power lasts for one period of time, after
which the new vintage technology becomes freely available.
Operation in the intermediate good sector involves red-tape costs due to the require-
ment to abide by complex norms and regulations in order to undertake production (think
of environmental regulation or industrial licensing where production is subject to admin-
istrative approval) that are more cumbersome in the presence of ine¢ cient bureaucracy.
These costs can be reduced by establishing a network with politicians in o¢ ce. The work-
ing of the network does not require any illegal activity such as bribes and corruption. As
we discussed in the Introduction, what is essential is to know the right person in the right
place (a ￿rolodex e⁄ect￿ ). The potential cost advantage of politically connected ￿rms is
13We do not model the occupational choice of individuals between working or managing a ￿rm. For the
purpose of our analysis, the selection process can be considered as purely random.
9thus related to extent of red-tape costs.
We denote with ￿ > 1 the marginal cost of production of ￿rms with no political
connections and normalize to 1 the marginal cost of production of politically connected
￿rms. In other words, the parameter ￿ captures in a reduced form the cost advantage of
politically connected ￿rms.14 A key feature of our model is that it takes one period for
the network to pay o⁄ so that the network advantage can be exploited by producers only
if a politician remains in o¢ ce for more than one period.
In each period, elections are held with two candidates (parties): I (which stands
for incumbent) and O (which stands for opponent). We denote with ￿ the (exogenous)
probability that in each period the incumbent politician is re-elected and assume that
electoral results at t are independent of electoral results at any other s 6= t: Electoral
results are relevant insofar as they a⁄ect the marginal cost of the incumbent producer.
If I is reelected, the incumbent producer with technology j is politically connected and
enjoys the cost advantage ￿ ￿ 1 over competitors. Otherwise, if O is elected, no producer
is politically connected and all ￿rms face the same marginal cost ￿. We assume that at
time 0 there is an incumbent politician I who is connected with the owner of technology
￿0 = 1.15
3.1 The one-period equilibrium
A standard assumption in the literature on Schumpeterian models of growth (see Gross-
man and Helpman [16]) is that in the intermediate good sector owners of di⁄erent vintages
compete ￿ la Bertrand. Since intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes in the produc-
tion of the ￿nal good, if all producers faced the same marginal costs of production, the
technological leader would enter the market in each period setting a limit price (slightly
lower than) ￿ times the marginal cost of production of the incumbent producer.
In our framework, however, the incumbent producer may be politically connected and
enjoy a cost advantage over the leader. In this case, the only active producer in each
period may either be the incumbent, who owns vintage j or the new entrant, who owns
vintage j + 1 and has no political connections.16
14Faccio [13] shows that politically connected ￿rms tend to bene￿t from preferential access to credit and
tax discounts. This type of bene￿ts could also be captured by the di⁄erence ￿ ￿ 1.
15Although it is natural to relate political persistence to electoral results, we can interpret ￿ more
generally as capturing the probability of an incumbent politician to remain in o¢ ce in the current period,
indipendently of whether it is an electoral period or not.
16Notice that although we assumed that, after one period, technology becomes freely available (which
means that at time t everybody may produce with technology j), the existence of political networks implies
10Notice that, in general, the incumbent ￿rm can prevent entry of the more advanced
competitor by setting a limit price equal to pxj = cj+1=￿ where cj+1 = ￿ is the marginal
cost of production of the competitor. Conversely, the outside ￿rm can enter the market
by setting a limit price equal to pxj+1 = ￿cj where cj = f1;￿g is the marginal cost of
production of the incumbent ￿rm. Clearly, if ￿ > ￿ the incumbent ￿rm cannot make
positive pro￿ts at the price which would keep the leading-edge ￿rm out of the market,
so that innovation would always occur. When ￿ < ￿, if cj = 1 the incumbent ￿rm wins
competition and prevents innovation; if cj = ￿ the leading-edge ￿rm wins competition,
enters the market and innovation takes place.
We can summarize this discussion in the following proposition which characterizes the
economic equilibrium:
Proposition 1 (The one-period equilibrium) Let ￿￿ < ￿ < 1=￿. Then:
(i) If 1 < ￿ < ￿ the leading-edge producer enters the market setting a limit price
pxj+1 = ￿￿ if and only if the next-to-leading edge (incumbent) producer is not politically
connected. Otherwise, the leading-edge producer wins competition setting a limit price
pxj+1 = ￿:
(ii) If ￿ > ￿ the leading-edge producer enters the market setting a limit price pxj+1 = ￿￿
if and only if the next-to-leading edge (incumbent) producer is not politically connected.
Otherwise, the next-to-leading edge (incumbent) producer wins competition setting a limit
price pxj = ￿=￿:
Proof. The leading-edge producer (new entrant) has a monopoly price equal to ￿=￿
while the incumbent has monopoly price 1=￿ if connected and ￿=￿ if unconnected. If the
incumbent is unconnected, the leading-edge producer can drive her out of the market by
setting the monopoly price ￿=￿, when ￿ > 1=￿, or the limit price ￿￿, when ￿ < 1=￿. In
fact the next-to-leading edge producer (incumbent) can at most set a price 1=￿ times that
of the leader. If the incumbent is connected, she drives the leader out of the market by
setting her monopoly price 1=￿, when ￿￿ > ￿, or the limit price ￿=￿, when ￿￿ < ￿ and
￿ > ￿. If ￿ < ￿ the next-to-leading edge producer makes negative pro￿ts at price ￿=￿ and
the leader acts as constrained monopolist setting a limit price equal to ￿ (if the incumbent
is connected) or ￿￿ (if the incumbent is not connected).
The last result shows that when regulatory costs ￿ are low with respect to quality
improvement ￿ political networks cannot prevent entry of the innovator and have no
that the ￿rm endowed with the new technology j+1 is the only one that can win competition with current
producer.
11in￿ uence on the economic equilibrium in terms of which ￿rm produces. However, political
connections still in￿ uence prices and income as they limit the monopoly power of new
entrants and drive prices down. On the contrary, when ￿ > ￿ political connections become
crucial for the possibility of innovation, as the owner of quality ￿j is able to prevent entry
of the innovator by exploiting the political connections that she established in the previous
period. Clearly, this requires that the incumbent politician is reelected at time t.
We can explicitly link our economic equilibrium to electoral results by means of the
following:
Corollary 1 Whenever the opponent politician O wins elections, innovation takes place
and the equilibrium price of the intermediate good is ￿￿. If the incumbent politician I
wins the elections and 1 < ￿ < ￿, innovation takes place and the equilibrium price of the
intermediate good is ￿. Otherwise, there is no innovation and the equilibrium price of the
intermediate good is ￿=￿:
To conclude this section, we investigate the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium.
First of all, we can write GDP at time t as the sum of wages and pro￿ts, that is:






























where c = f1;￿g if the producer is incumbent or new entrant respectively and s = fj;j+1g.
As established in Proposition 1, the price of the intermediate good and the level of
GDP at time t depend on who wins the election at t and on the relative magnitude of ￿
and ￿.
Let us denote with ￿L, ￿H choices of ￿ such that ￿L 2 [1;￿) and ￿H 2 (￿;1),




































if the opponent wins the election. Notice that, in this case, as established in Corollary 1,
innovation occurs at each point in time so that the level of technology j at the beginning
of period t is equal to t:











































if the opponent wins the election. In this case, innovation occurs only in periods when the
opponent politician is elected, so that j ￿ t:
Comparing these levels of GDP, we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Static e¢ ciency of the network) In each period and for any possible
level of ￿, the price of the intermediate good is lower and the level of GDP is higher if the
incumbent politician is re-elected.
Proof. 1) ￿I
￿H;t > ￿O
￿H;t: It is easy to verify that if the leading-edge technology ￿rm





















which holds as long as ￿ < ￿. By Proposition 1 we know that pxj+1 is actually equal to





￿L;t: Here it is enough to notice that technology is the same regardless of
which politician is elected and that px would be higher when the opponent politician is
elected.
As the last proposition show, from a static point of view, in all cases the highest
level of GDP is achieved when the incumbent politician is re-elected. This is due to
the fact that, given the level of technology j achieved at the beginning of period t, the
incumbent producer is more e¢ cient when she can exploit her political network, that is
when the incumbent politician wins. When ￿ < ￿, this implies that the innovator faces a
more e¢ cient competitor and is forced to set a lower price when the incumbent politician
is elected. When ￿ > ￿, the innovator cannot enter the market when the incumbent
politician is elected as the incumbent producer can set a lower (quality-adjusted price) by
exploiting her connections.
134 Dynamics and welfare analysis
In the previous section we analyzed the properties of the one-period equilibrium of our
economy and emphasized the static e¢ ciency of the network, which reduces the production
costs of the incumbent ￿rm and brings about a reduction in the level of prices.
Here we extend the analysis to take into account the dynamic implications of the
network between ￿rms and politicians. As we have seen in the previous section, when
regulatory costs are high (￿ > ￿), innovation can be blocked by the incumbent ￿rm which
exploits political connections at the expense of the technological leader. Thus, politicians￿
re-election entails a short-run bene￿t in terms of lower current prices and a long-run cost
in terms of technological upgrades and future productivity.
To highlight the dynamic costs of network, let us compute the expected value at the
beginning of time t of GDP at time t + k with k ￿ 1; which we denote as Et (￿t+k):17







where P = fI;Og, ￿ = f￿L;￿Hg, j is the
given level of technology at the beginning of time t and z denotes the number of times








When ￿ < ￿, we know from Proposition 1 that innovation always occurs, so that z = k
and we can write:


















When ￿ > ￿; in each period innovation depends on electoral results and z becomes
a random variable with binomial distribution b(k;1 ￿ ￿) where the probability of success
(i.e. innovation) in each of the k trials is equal to the probability that the opponent is




￿ are independent, we can write:






























Consider the second equality in each equation. In both cases, the expected level of
future GDP is the product of two terms. The ￿rst is a ￿growth e⁄ect￿and measures the
expected quality of technology after the t + k elections which is equal to ￿
￿(j+k)
1￿￿ when
17To make it clear, from now on Et(x) denotes the expected value of x where expectation is taken before
the election at t:
18In other words, here we are looking at the expected value of GDP after k+1 elections, from t to t+k:












￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿O
￿
￿
which is related to the static consequences of the network and
depends only on the electoral result at time t + k.
We can now use our previous results to derive welfare implications. More speci￿cally,
we can try to rank in welfare terms the two alternative technological trajectories associated
with ￿L and ￿H. In so doing, we consider the point of view of an in￿nite-horizon benevolent
planner who compares the corresponding discounted sums of aggregate GDP from time 0




















































so that we can write the following:
Proposition 3 (Welfare) The trajectory with ￿L is superior in terms of welfare to the
trajectory with ￿H:
Proof. First of all, we need to prove that
￿
￿￿I





























































19Notice that when ￿ < ￿ the expected quality of technology is also the actual quality, as innnovation
always occurs.
20This requires assuming ￿￿
￿
1￿￿ < 1:
15which is equivalent to comparing two levels of GDP in equation (5); the one on the LHS
with px = 1 and c = ￿L=￿ and the one on the RHS with px = ￿H=￿ and c = 1. Clearly,
the LHS is larger than the RHS
Finally, let us compute the expected rate of growth of the economy, de￿ned as Et(gt+1) =
Et (ln￿t+1 ￿ ln￿t): Given equations (6) - (9), we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (The average growth rate) At any time t, the average growth rate of
GDP between t and t + 1 is constant. This growth rate is equal to E(g￿L) = ￿
1￿￿ ln￿ if
￿ = ￿L and to E(g￿H) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
1￿￿ ln￿ if ￿ = ￿H.
Proof. 1) Consider the case ￿ = ￿L: The expected growth rate is equal to:
￿2[ln￿I
￿L;t+1 ￿ ln￿I















2) Consider the case ￿ = ￿H: Here the expected growth rate is:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[ln￿O
￿H;t ￿ ln￿I






= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[ln￿I
￿H;t+1 ￿ ln￿I
￿H;t] + (1 ￿ ￿)2[ln￿O
￿H;t+1 ￿ ln￿O




With regard to the relationship between growth and probability of re-election, notice
that when the network advantage of the politically connected producer is not so strong
to allow him to prevent entry of competitors with leading-edge technology, innovation
takes place irrespective of electoral results and the expected growth rate of income is
not a⁄ected by the probability that the incumbent politician is re-elected. Instead, when
the next-to-leading edge producer can prevent entry of competitors with more advanced
technology by exploiting her political connections, innovation will not take place whenever
the incumbent politician is re-elected, implying that the expected growth rate is decreasing
with the probability that the incumbent politician is re-elected.
5 Conclusions
Excessive regulatory and administrative burdens due to cumbersome regulatory and ad-
ministrative requirements and/or ine¢ cient bureaucracy are often pointed out as a major
16hindrance to growth as they subtract resources to investment and innovation and represent
a barrier to entry for new ￿rms and superior technologies.
In this paper, we consider red-tape as a production cost for ￿rms that can be mitigated
through political connections in a relationship-based system (￿knowing the right person
in the right place￿ ). As establishing connections requires time but no extra resources,
operating ￿rms face lower marginal costs than potential competitors. Thus, incumbent
￿rms may be able to prevent entry of competitors with superior technology if they can
exploit their political connections, that is, if politicians do not change too frequently. For
the society as a whole, this creates a trade-o⁄ between short-run bene￿ts of keeping the
status quo and enjoying low prices and long-run costs of retarding technological upgrade.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the magnitude of red-tape costs plays a cru-
cial role in determining whether we should expect a relationship between the frequency
of political change and economic growth. When red-tape costs are high, the advantage
granted by political connections allows the incumbent to maintain her dominant position
and prevent technological innovation, implying a negative relationship between political
persistence and economic growth. Instead, when red-tape costs are low, political con-
nections become irrelevant, innovation takes place irrespective of political turnouts and
political persistence and economic growth are unrelated.
The results of our model provide a possible explanation for the empirical evidence of
a negative association between political persistence and economic growth in presence of
high red-tape costs, that we documented in the ￿rst part of the paper. This correlation
turned out to be robust to the inclusion of dummies for country ￿xed e⁄ects and time
e⁄ects and of standard control variables, such as initial GDP, investment ratio, education
levels, etc. Although we could not establish a causal link between persistence and growth,
we argued that reverse causation should not alter our main results.
Our theoretical analysis could be extended in di⁄erent ways. In particular, it could
be interesting to incorporate political economy considerations in order to endogenize the
probability of being re-elected. Although potentially complicated by the dynamic nature
of our model, this extension might shed light on the e⁄ects of bureaucratic (in)e¢ ciency
on the persistence of politicians, and on the reasons why politicians are often reluctant to
reform the bureaucracy. Moreover, this extension could highlight political and economic
con￿ icts between short-sighted and long-sighted agents, which in an overlapping genera-
tions set-up would give rise to intergenerational con￿ icts between the young (more inclined
to political turnover and economic change) and the old (supporting the status quo).
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196 Data Appendix
In this Appendix we provide information about data used in Section 2.
6.1 List of variables and data sources
In the following we present the list of variables, organized by data source.
World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (WDI)
FERT: log of total fertility rate (births per woman)
GDP: log of gross domestic product per capita, PPP (constant 2005 PPP USD)
GROWTH: average annual growth rate of gross domestic product per capita (constant
2005 PPP USD)
World Bank￿ s Database of Political Institution (DPI)
DEMO: dummy indicating fully democratic countries. DEMO =1 if both LIEC = 7
and EIEC = 7, the former indicating fully competitive legislative elections and the latter
indicating fully competitive executive elections
EXELEC: dummy indicating that an executive election took place in a given year
LEGELEC: dummy indicating that a legislative election took place in a given year
PERS: PERS = 1- STABS
STABS: share of veto players that drop from the government in any given year. In
fully democratic countries, veto players are de￿ned as the chief executive (counted twice
if she￿ s competitively elected) and the opposition if it controls the legislature. In addition,
each chamber (unless the chief executive controls the lower house through a closed list
system) and each of the party allied with the president is a veto player in presidential
systems. In parliamentary systems, veto players are those parties that are necessary for
the winning coalition to keep the absolute majority in the government and those parties
in the government coalition that are ideologically nearer to opposition parties.
Penn World Table 6.1. (PWT)
GOV: government expenditure as share of GDP
INV: investment as share of GDP.
Barro and Lee
EDU: average schooling years in total population
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
BQ: bureaucratic quality (0-4 scale) in 1984. High values are given to countries where
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy
or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends
20to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mecha-
nism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning e⁄ect of a strong
bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in
terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions
dH: dummy variable taking value one (zero) when BQ is below (above) a certain
threshold (see Section 2)
CORR: control of corruption (0-6 scale). Low values correspond to a very poor control
of corruption (or very high level of corruption). The variable measures mainly actual or
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor
exchange, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business
6.2 Countries
Our sample includes 56 countries for which DEMO=1 in the 1975-2004 period and data are
available for PERS and GROWTH. Countries are listed below, together with the number
of observations available for each country in the period 1980-2004 (in parentheses). For
51 countries we have information also on BQ. There are 18 low-cost countries with an
average of 4.78 observations each, while there are 33 high-cost countries with an average
of 3.06 observations per country.
Low red-tape costs countries: Australia (5), Austria (5), Belgium (5), Canada
(5), Denmark (5), Finland (5), France (5), Iceland (5), Ireland (5), Japan (4), Netherlands
(5), New Zealand (5), Norway (5), South Africa (2), Sweden (5), Switzerland (5), UK (5),
USA (5).
High red-tape costs countries: Argentina (3), Bolivia (2), Brazil (3), Chile (2),
Colombia (5), Costa Rica (5), Cyprus (2), Ecuador (4), El Salvador (3), Greece (4),
Guatemala (2), Honduras (3), India (3), Israel (5), Italy (4), Korea (3), Malaysia (2),
Mexico (3), Nicaragua (3), Panama (3), Paraguay (2), Peru (3), Poland (2), Portugal (4),
Senegal (2), Spain (4), Sri Lanka (3), Thailand (2), Trinidad and Tobago (2), Turkey (3),
Uruguay (3), Venezuela (4).
Remaining countries for which no data on BQ are available are: Bahamas (3), Germany
(5), Luxembourg (5), Madagascar (2), Malta (5).
21(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PERSt￿1 -0.024* -0.028** -0.032** -0.001 -0.054** -0.017 -0.009 -0.012
[0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.023] [0.019] [0.020]
dH￿PERSt￿1 -0.026 -0.032 -0.023
[0.030] [0.026] [0.026]
GDP -0.078*** -0.099*** -0.097***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
EDU 0.002 0.003 0.003
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
GOV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0001**
-0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
INV -0.002*** -0.00121*** -0.001**
[0.0004] [0.000427] [0.0004]




Observations 205 187 187 86 101 187 185 179
Countries 56 53 51 18 33 51 51 51
R2 0.138 0.464 0.128 0.363 0.293 0.133 0.509 0.410
b ￿1+b ￿2 -0.043** -0.040*** -0.035**
[0.020] [0.015] [0.016]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 1. Dependent variable: 5-year average annual growth rate of per capita GDP
(constant 2005 PPP USD)
22(1) (2) (3) (4)
LSDV LSDVC LSDV LSDVC
Country dummies YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
PERSt￿1 -0.125** -0.132* -0.040 -0.076
[0.062] [0.077] [0.114] [0.184]
dH￿PERSt￿1 -0.119 -0.079
[0.134] [0.209]
GDPt￿1 0.548*** 0.759*** 0.546*** 0.761***
[0.075] [0.160] [0.075] [0.178]
Observations 165 83 165 83
Number of countries 51 48 51 48
R2 0.786 0.788
b ￿2+b ￿3 -0.160** -0.156
[0.0740] [0.101]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2. Dependent variable: 5-year average log of per capita GDP (constant 2005 PPP
USD)
236.3 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 3 and 4 report descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.
Full Sample Low Cost Countries High Cost Countries
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
PERS 187 0.84 0.12 86 0.85 0.12 101 0.83 0.12
GROWTH 187 1.88 2.00 86 1.84 1.45 101 1.91 2.37
GDP 187 9.43 0.87 86 10.10 0.28 101 8.87 0.81
EDU 187 7.54 2.47 86 9.44 1.37 101 5.92 2.01
GOV 185 15.34 8.01 86 11.91 6.10 99 18.32 8.31
INV 187 20.14 6.65 86 23.37 4.49 99 17.34 6.97
FERT 187 0.79 0.38 86 0.58 0.16 101 0.98 0.41
CORR 181 4.61 1.92 83 5.98 1.81 98 3.45 1.05
BQ 187 2.83 1.28 86 3.94 0.16 101 1.89 1.04
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
PERS GROWTH GDP EDU GOV INV FERT CORR
GROWTH -0.06 1.00
GDP 0.10 -0.06 1.00
EDU 0.20** 0.07 0.80** 1.00
GOV -0.20** -0.11 -0.54** -0.41** 1.00
INV 0.04 -0.04 0.69** 0.58** -0.41** 1.00
FERT -0.06 -0.18* -0.82** -0.65** 0.52** -0.64** 1.00
CORR -0.01 -0.05 0.51** 0.50** -0.11 0.37** -0.43** 1.00
BQ 0.06 0.01 0.73** 0.63** -0.39** 0.54** -0.63** 0.59**
Table 4. Pairwise correlations; * signi￿cant at 5% level; ** signi￿cant at 1% level
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